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Paper Trail: Working Papers and Recent Scholarship
Editor’s Note: In this edition we review two papers by leading government economists, past, present, and perhaps future. The first
paper, by Dennis Carlton and Ken Heyer, takes a cautious policy approach to single-firm conduct based on theory, empirical evidence, and “considerations of administrability and consistency with general and widely held presumptions” and sets out four
“underlying principles” that should govern policy toward single-firm conduct. The second paper, on the role of market concentration in modern economic analysis of horizontal mergers, is by Jonathan Baker, in which he explains how market concentration can
sensibly be used for merger analysis. Send suggestions for papers to review to: page@law.ufl.edu or jwoodbury@crai.com.
—W I L L I A M H. P A G E

AND

J O H N R. W O O D B U R Y

Recent Papers

Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Appropriate Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1111665
In this paper, Dennis Carlton of the University of Chicago and recently Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust in the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, and Ken Heyer, Economics
Director of the Antitrust Division, articulate a cautious policy approach to single-firm conduct based
on theory, empirical evidence, and “considerations of administrability and consistency with general
and widely held presumptions.” They distinguish two types of single-firm conduct: extraction,
which “capture[s] surplus from what the firm has itself created independent of the conduct’s effect
on rivals,” and extension, which “increases the firm’s profit by weakening or eliminating the competitive constraints provided by products of rivals.” They argue that extraction should be per se lawful and that extension should be unlawful only in narrowly defined circumstances.
In the course of developing this distinction, the authors articulate four “underlying principles”
that should govern policy toward single-firm conduct. These are the principles, in the authors’
words:
1. Simple monopoly pricing is legitimate because it spurs dynamic efficiency.
2. Extraction of surplus through means other than simple monopoly pricing is equally as
“legitimate” as monopoly pricing, based principally on its impact on dynamic efficiency,
all else equal.
3. Where scale economies matter, conduct that deprives rivals of scale may (but will not
necessarily) harm competition.
4. Certain core components of competition—introducing better products and lowering production costs in particular—are in virtually all circumstances so likely to promote welfare
and economic growth that they should be permitted by antitrust despite a theoretical possibility that protecting competitors from them will in rare circumstances enhance welfare.
The costs of identifying and effectively remedying those rare but theoretically possible
exceptions are too high to merit exposing such conduct to possible antitrust attack.
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Although the authors concede that these principles are not all currently “susceptible to strong
empirical verification,” they express the utopian dream that, in the future, empirical testing will
make antitrust a “science based on facts and less a policy driven primarily by beliefs.”
Carlton and Heyer begin their analysis by justifying their first principle, which states that charging a single monopoly price should be per se lawful. They first observe that, even though single
price monopoly is inefficient in a static comparison with competition, it provides a necessary
incentive to innovation. They offer the example of a firm that makes a risky investment in developing new software that becomes extremely popular, gains monopoly power, and generates profits far above normal. To condemn the high prices as exploitative based on the ex post outcome
would undermine incentives for the firm and others from contemplating similar high-risk investments in innovative products. Even if the firms’ profits in a particular case turn out to be higher
than necessary to have induced the initial investment, any effort by antitrust regulators to cap
prices would likely entail far more direct costs of regulation and indirect costs in diminished innovation than the transitory benefits to consumers from lower prices.
Carlton and Heyer then extend this safe harbor to practices that exploit monopoly power to
extract surplus through (1) price discrimination, (2) commitments to limit ex post opportunistic
behavior, and (3) simple refusals to deal. Perfect price discrimination, they note, is more efficient
than simple monopoly pricing and thus should be lawful. But, the authors argue, even if discrimination is imperfect and less efficient than competition, courts should not condemn it. The same
dynamic efficiency considerations that support single monopoly pricing also support price discrimination, because “efficient incentives for investment generally improve, the more surplus the
firm is able to capture when its innovations create the surplus.” Particularly where entry entails
high fixed costs, the authors argue, “[s]ophisticated pricing or other business strategies may be
necessary for the firm to generate revenue greater than the total cost of economically desirable
investment and production.” Thus, the authors propose that any use of tying to accomplish price
discrimination, for example by metering intensity of buyers’ demand for the tying product, should
be lawful “regardless of its effects on static efficiency.”
Similar reasoning, according to the authors, supports per se legality for restraints that allow a
monopolist credibly to commit to its buyers not to engage in ex post opportunistic behavior.
Vertical territorial restraints, for example, might allow a seller to persuade a dealer that the seller
will not later offer more favorable terms to rivals. Although these commitments allow the seller more
fully to exploit monopoly power, they constitute pure extraction and thus should be lawful.
Unconditional refusals to deal also should be lawful, Carlton and Heyer argue, because they
allow the seller to protect its investment in assets that it has created. The authors suggest tentatively that where patent owners (as in Rambus) mislead standard-setting bodies about the existence of their patent claims, then later refuse to license the patents at “reasonable” prices, the
appropriate remedy should be a breach of contract claim rather than an antitrust action.
In the last third of the paper, Carlton and Heyer argue that various forms of monopoly “extension” may “enhance[] the firm’s profitability by weakening the constraints imposed by competitors.” Examples include successful predatory pricing and tying arrangements that deny rivals the
ability to achieve minimum efficient scale. This latter example leads the authors to propose that
extension can only occur when “scale economies matter nontrivially” and therefore “marginal cost
is declining.” If marginal cost is constant, then, unless rivals are entirely driven from the market,
they continue to constrain the dominant firms’ pricing as before. Thus, the authors propose a safe
harbor for conduct that does not “does not seriously raise rivals’ marginal costs or threaten their
very survival.”
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Even some conduct that denies rivals efficient scale, however, should be lawful if it is beneficial in other ways. Above-cost price-cutting, a cost-reducing merger, or even introducing a new
product may “capture business that would otherwise go to price-constraining rivals” and thus (theoretically) reduce welfare. Nevertheless, U.S. courts have generally followed Carlton and Heyer’s
fourth principle, which makes these kinds of practices lawful because of their tangible, present
benefits, despite their theoretical future anticompetitive effects.
That leaves monopoly extension without tangible present benefits. The authors consider and
reject, based on our present knowledge, the possibility that this sort of conduct should be per se
lawful because of its potential benefit to dynamic efficiency:
There seems no particular reason for believing that the prospect of greater profits through monopoly
extension would itself foster, rather than perhaps even deter, innovation. The future beneficiaries of
additional profits from monopoly extension will not obviously be those who have developed the best
or most innovative products. And indeed, anticompetitive behavior by firms temporarily in the lead (or
“dominant”) in particular markets may as well prevent and deter, rather than enhance, the chances of
better products achieving success (and hence being developed and introduced in the first place).
While we are unaware of empirical studies showing that an added incentive to become a bigger and
more impregnable monopolist through legalizing monopoly extension would lower welfare, we remain
skeptical. Although we do not favor a change in the current system that would permit virtually all manner of unilateral conduct by firms, we remain open to further evidence.

In a brief final section, Carlton and Heyer argue that, while courts should not condemn monopoly extraction as a rule of liability, they may regulate extraction as a remedy, where a firm has
acquired monopoly power by monopoly extension.
Although the authors disclaim any intent to speak for the Antitrust Division, their cautious
approach is consistent with the Division’s Section 2 policy under the current administration. As the
fall elections approach, it should contribute to the discussion of the proper place of Section 2 in
public enforcement.
—WHP

Jonathan Baker, Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Mergers
(May 19, 2008) (forthcoming in A NTITRUST L AW & E CONOMICS , Keith Hylton ed., 2009)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092248
Jonathan Baker (who has an affiliation with my employer) is one of the leading antitrust economists
(we ignore his legal training purposely) with interesting and sometimes controversial insights into
the application of economics to mergers and single-firm behavior. Not only is he a prolific writer,
Baker is also one who can translate often abstruse and complicated economic analyses into lucid
prose. That ability is illustrated in this paper on the role of market concentration in modern economic analysis of horizontal mergers. Baker explains why reliance on market concentration can
be a sensible approach for merger analysis. But as I discuss in greater detail below, I do have to
wonder if, at the end of the day, he is trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. Indeed, I wonder if he has actually proven the negative—that the role of market concentration in economic
merger analysis is becoming irrelevant.
Baker begins by reviewing the modern legal history of the use of concentration in merger analysis beginning with the 1950 amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act. At that time, courts were prepared to condemn even the smallest of mergers in markets where concentration was increasing.
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During the late 1960s through the 1970s in particular, the previously difficult-to-rebut presumption
that a merger in a market with high and increasing concentration would result in consumer harm
gave way to a more measured approach. In this antitrust evolution, the courts agreed that other
factors could reasonably be used to rebut a government claim of competitive harm simply
because the merger would lead to a significantly more concentrated market.
In terms of using market concentration in merger analysis, one needs first to define the market
before one can calculate the requisite market shares. As critical as it is to the structural component of merger analysis, Baker doesn’t spend much time on market definition except to note that
it is (currently) driven by demand-side substitutability, highlighting the importance of the role of
own-price demand elasticity in determining whether this is a monopoly worth having. The almost
passing reference to market definition may make sense because the focus of the paper is on the
role of market concentration, assuming a market definition. But it would have been nice if Baker
had provided the reader with some literature references on the methodology of defining markets
other than his own recent paper in the Antitrust Law Journal (say, to take a random example, the
Moresi-Salop-Woodbury paper on critical loss that recently appeared in the Antitrust Source).
Baker goes on to note that the four-firm concentration ratio—the sum of the shares of the
largest four firms in the market—was used from the 1950s through the 1970s as a key component
of the antitrust merger evaluation process. The 1982 Merger Guidelines then ushered in the widespread use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)—the sum of squared shares of the players
in the defined market. One reason for the use of the HHI was its conceptual underpinnings. In a
classic paper, George Stigler demonstrated how the HHI could be used as an indicator of cartel
stability.1 In particular, Stigler showed that the higher the HHI—reflecting a more skewed, more
highly concentrated market—the greater the likelihood that a cartel would be able to detect any
cheating on an agreement to maintain prices above competitive levels. The larger the firms are,
the more difficult is it to cheat. Subsequent literature related the HHI to price levels in static noncooperative oligopoly models. And there was also an empirical literature that demonstrated a
positive correlation between higher concentration—sometimes the four-firm concentration ratio,
sometimes the HHI—and higher profitability or higher price-cost margins or higher prices.
But contemporary antitrust analysis attaches far less significance to concentration than in the
past, in assessing the potential both for adverse coordinated and particularly for adverse unilateral effects arising from a merger. Indeed, Baker notes that “concentration can be informative with
respect to each type of competitive effects analysis, though in each case, with the right information, competitive effects can also be understood without reference to shares and concentration.”
(p. 8)
Turning first to coordinated effects, Baker begins by highlighting the litany of conditions that
may complicate coming to a price consensus among the firms in a market or conditions that make
it difficult to maintain that consensus, such as cost and share asymmetries among the firms,
excess capacity, product heterogeneity, and large buyers. Using a simple model, Baker explains
clearly the modern approach to evaluating the effect of a merger on the likelihood of collusion.
But, you might ask, what about the HHI? What about concentration? Baker notes the role of
concentration as a way of gauging the likelihood of collusion via the dinner scheduling analogy—
it is easier to reach agreement on the date of the dinner when there are fewer parties involved.
Then he goes on to note (p. 10) that reliance on concentration amounts to reliance on “a statistical prediction rather than an appeal to a mechanism to show why [any particular] merger matters.”

1

George Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. P OL . E CON . 44 (1964).
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I’ve struggled a bit to try to understand whether that characterization understates the significance of market concentration. On the one hand, the concentration exercise is more arithmetic
than analytic—one compares the current shares of the N firms to the shares of the N-1 firms when
the shares of the merging parties are summed together. It doesn’t say anything about how the
characteristics of the particular firms merging may affect that analysis, although a complete
merger evaluation would encompass those merger-specific characteristics. On the other hand,
there are analytic bases for drawing inferences from changes in concentration to changes in the
likelihood of collusion, as in the previously mentioned Stigler paper.
Baker then turns to describing a different model of collusion that reflects the components of
more contemporary thinking about the effect of a horizontal merger on increasing the likelihood of
adverse coordinated effects. This model indicates how reliance on simple measures of concentration can generate “false positives.” Here, the paper is at Baker-best in illustrating that contemporary thinking. Briefly, he arrays firms beginning with the least likely to cheat on any tacit agreement and ending with the firm most likely to cheat. Firms that are less likely to cheat are those for
which the profits from adhering to a coordinated agreement are high relative to the benefits of
cheating. The firm-perceived benefits from cheating are higher the larger is its actual output relative to its potential output (i.e., when all excess capacity has been utilized) and the lower the extent
to which firms discount payments received in the future. That is, other things equal, more patient
firms are more likely to adhere to a price agreement rather than to take the money and run.
And other things equal, the higher the price, the greater the profits from undercutting the
agreed-to price by just a shade and so the greater is the incentive to cheat. Thus, in choosing
what the agreement price should be, the participating firms cannot set a price so high that the firm
that is most likely to cheat will cheat—the firm that Baker identifies as the maverick firm. It is the
maverick’s incentives to cheat that determine what the agreed-to price will be.
In this model, a merger between two non-maverick firms will have no effect on the agreed-to
price (providing the merger itself does not induce a change in the maverick’s incentives). By contrast, a merger between a non-maverick and a maverick will increase the agreed-to price. The
non-maverick already (by construction) had no incentive to cheat at the currently agreed-upon
price, so combining the maverick with the non-maverick can be thought of as (roughly speaking)
dulling the cheating incentives of the maverick firm and so permitting a price increase by the collusive firms.
In this model, then, concentration seemingly tells one nothing about whether a merger in this
market will result in higher post-merger prices. If one of the merging firms is a maverick, then the
merger would be price-increasing. If neither of the merging firms is the maverick, then price
increases would not result from the merger. Indeed, in this model, the only incentive for merger
between non-mavericks must be efficiencies, which in turn may result in the merged firm becoming the new “marginal” firm. Of course, the efficiencies generated by a merger between a maverick and non-maverick could increase rather then reduce the incentives to cheat, but in that
merger, more analysis is necessary to determine whether the expected merger gains are positive.
The trick is to identify the maverick, which brings us back to concentration: “Greater concentration raises the odds that any particular merger involves a maverick.” (p.16) When mergers
occur in (correctly defined) markets where concentration is high, then Baker argues, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the merger will have adverse coordinated effects. The odds that the
merger involves a maverick firm are greater for higher concentration levels than for lower concentration levels. The presumption can be rebutted by other evidence suggesting the difficulties
of coordination.
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At first glance, this approach may seem reasonable and perhaps even obvious—mergers in
more concentrated markets need to be examined more closely. On the “that’s obvious” point, it’s
not where we end up but how get there that is the insight of contemporary thinking because it says
something about how we should interpret high concentration and what we should look for in term
of “plus” (or “minus”) factors in understanding the merger’s competitive effects.
But what seems to be left out is the question of how we deal with a merger between two very
small share firms. Does the change in concentration indicate something about the likelihood that
the merger involves a maverick? If the concentration change is small, should we interpret that
change as suggesting that the likelihood that this merger involves a maverick is also small? That
seems at least a bit wrong because normally, we think of the maverick as one of the smaller-share
firms in the industry. And it seems wrong in light of Baker’s own model in which (other things equal)
the lower-share firms have the most to benefit from cheating.
Baker then turns to assessing the role of concentration in what may be more familiar ground to
antitrust counsel in particular—unilateral effects in differentiated product industries. To briefly
reprise, the likelihood of adverse unilateral effects of a merger depends upon the substitutability
of the goods sold by the two merging parties. Pre-merger, merging firm A loses sales when it
increases prices and that loss constrains the extent to which pre-merger A can charge a high
price. But some of the profit from those lost sales will be captured by its merger partner B. So postmerger, when A is setting its profit-maximizing price, it effectively loses less sales for any particular price increase because now some of those losses are recaptured by A via its merger with firm
B. Thus, post-merger, A has an incentive to increase prices above its pre-merger level because
one of its pre-merger competitive constraints—the goods sold by firm B—is no longer a constraint.
This post-merger effect is also true for B’s price-setting calculus.
The magnitude of the post-merger price effect depends on a number of critical parameters, one
of them being the extent to which consumers view the goods sold by A as a substitute for those
sold by B and similarly for the goods sold by B. The greater the extent to which consumers view
A and B as close (not necessarily the closest) substitutes, the greater will be the sales recapture
rate by A and B and so the greater the incentive for post-merger price increases.
In the absence of any information on the recapture rate, one kluge is to assume that the second choices of (e.g.) firm A consumers are proportional to the shares of A’s rivals in the defined
market. Focusing on the substitutability of B for A, suppose A had a 20 percent share and B had
a 15 percent share. Using this proportionality assumption, of those lost sales by A that stay within the defined market upon an increase in A’s price, the likelihood of A losing sales to B is the share
of B in total sales in the defined market, excluding A. In this example, the proportion of lost sales
by A that are recaptured by B is simply [15%/(100% – 20%)] or about 19%. The proportion of lost
sales by B that are recaptured by A is simply [20%/(100% – 15%)] or about 24%.
So what about the role of concentration in this analysis? Baker observes (p. 20) that there is
“nothing in [the] intuition about unilateral competitive effects [that] obviously or necessarily
requires market definition or relates the magnitude of unilateral effects to market concentration.”
As the above example suggests, what counts is the extent to which the second choices of consumers of one of the merging parties are the goods sold by the other merging party. While Baker
goes on to extend a model to show how concentration matters, it seems even within that model,
all that really counts is the market share of each merging party from which a recapture rate can
be inferred. And if there exist consumer surveys or demand econometrics that provide a “better”
estimate of the recapture rates (i.e., rates that are estimated from consumer behavior, not
assumed as with proportional recapture rates), the shares play an even more diminished role.
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One point in the paper merits further thought. Suppose that use of a simulation model suggested a small post-merger price increase after accounting for efficiencies—Baker uses a 2 percent example. Should that be of concern to the antitrust authorities? Baker in effect notes that the
magnitude of the predicted price increase must be weighed against the uncertainty of the shareestimated recapture rates and for smaller price increases in particular, more non-simulation evidence should be gathered before concluding that the merger will harm consumers.
But one’s confidence in the predicted price increase goes far beyond the degree of confidence
one has in the recapture rate estimates. There is also uncertainty about the nature of demand
(e.g., is it linear or is it constant elasticity?), about the margin estimates (have incremental costs
been accurately measured?), about the calibration of the model to be consistent with current
prices and shares at some inevitably arbitrary point in time (should you use the last six months or
the last year or the last two years?), and about the underlying model itself (is it Cournot, Bertrand,
or an auction model?), among other sources of uncertainty about the inputs into the model. These
sources of uncertainty certainly caution against any blind reliance on the predicted price effects
as the basis for a conclusion about the merger’s competitive effects. Indeed, this uncertainty suggests that even what might be regarded as relatively large predicted post-merger price increases (e.g., 5 percent) may not be held with much confidence.
In short, there is something of a “square-peg/round hole” flavor of attempting to fit concentration into the unilateral effects analysis.2 It certainly is easy to read the paper as concluding that in
unilateral effects, reliance on concentration measures to infer competitive harm is misplaced. With
regard to coordinated effects, Baker’s analysis is insightful, but perhaps incomplete. As noted
above, I do think there are more reasons than those ultimately relied on by (but discussed by)
Baker for attaching significance to concentration in coordinated effects analysis. For example,
Baker too quickly dismisses the relevance of the apparent statistical regularity indicating that
higher prices and higher concentration are correlated.
This paper is accessible to a wide audience of antitrust practitioners and all in all, makes for
good summer reading. 
— J RW

2

In this regard, it’s interesting that Baker begins by stating his purpose as evaluating “the extent to which modern economic analysis supports a role for concentration in the antitrust review of horizontal mergers.” (p.1) Baker concludes that “there is a sensible basis for inferring harm to competition from market concentration or market shares.” (p. 26) (emphasis added.) While market shares are a structural
measure, the reliance on specific market shares is not the same as reliance on concentration measures in the merger analysis.

